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Abstract 
We examine peer effects in welfare use among immigrants to Sweden by 
exploiting a governmental refugee placement policy. We distinguish between 
the quantity of contacts – the number of individuals of the same ethnicity – and 
the quality of contacts – welfare use among members of the ethnic group. OLS 
regressions suggest that both these factors are positively related to individual 
welfare use. Instrumental variables estimations yield the conclusion that only 
the quality of contacts matter. An increase of the fraction of the ethnic group on 
welfare by 10 percent raises the individual probability of welfare use by almost 
7 percent. 
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1 Introduction 
In all industrialized countries there is concentration of the poor, particularly 
immigrants, in metropolitan areas. Universally, there is also great concern that 
this kind of segregation may be detrimental for individual outcomes. In the US, 
this concern has led to the design of policies such as “Moving to opportunity” 
in Boston and the Gautreaux program in Chicago.
1 Practically all developed 
countries also implement various forms of “neighborhood development prog-
rams”. 
The potentially detrimental effects of segregation have also been a concern 
in the Swedish policy discussion. High and rising welfare use among 
immigrants and other disadvantaged groups rose to the fore of policy agenda 
during the economic downturn of the 1990s.
2 Some observers argued that part 
of the increase in welfare participation can be attributed to the fact that the 
“stigma” of welfare use decreases along with the overall increase in the number 
of individuals on welfare; see Lindbeck (1997) for instance. 
A feed-back from overall welfare use to individual welfare participation is 
an example of a social network effect. The effect of social networks on indivi-
dual behavior has been a topic among sociologists for long. Economists have 
only recently become interested in this question, however. There are substantial 
difficulties in establishing that a particular empirical regularity reflects a causal 
mechanism running from the characteristics of the social network to individual 
behavior. For instance, it is a stylized fact that the participation of immigrants 
in various public support systems is greater in immigrant dense areas; however, 
it is clearly premature to infer that the higher participation rate is caused by 
living in these areas. Such inference suffers from what Manski (1993) calls the 
“reflection problem”. The essence of this problem is that omitted individual 
and neighborhood characteristics may imply that individual behavior and the 
behavior of the neighborhood as a whole are reflections of one another. The 
reflection problem leads to a correlation between individual and group be-
havior, which does not have a causal interpretation. 
                                                      
1 See Katz et al. (2001) for an analysis of the Moving to Opportunity and Rosenbaum (1995) for 
an analysis of the Gautreaux program. 
2 Most of the time we use the US term “welfare” instead of using “social assistance”, which is 
the more correct, although more cumbersome, terminology. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  4 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether immigrant welfare use is 
causally affected by ethnic concentration and welfare use among their ethnic 
peers. To estimate these effects we utilize an immigrant policy initiative in 
Sweden. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Swedish immigration authori-
ties distributed refugee immigrants across neighborhoods in a way that we 
argue was independent of unobserved individual characteristics. We have used 
this policy experiment in earlier work dealing with the earnings effect of living 
in ethnic enclaves; see Edin et al. (2003). 
We also build on the recent work by Bertrand et al. (2000). They utilize the 
fact that ethnic concentration varies within neighborhood. Under the 
assumption that immigrants interact mainly with their ethnic peers, they can 
thus eliminate the influence of unobserved neighborhood characteristics 
common across individuals. Since the main effects of ethnic concentration 
(quantity) and ethnic welfare use (quality) may be biased because of sorting on 
unobserved ability, the authors focus on the quantity-quality interaction. This 
strategy makes a lot of sense, but may still have some limitations. We think the 
major drawback is that Bertrand et al. are unable to obtain unbiased estimates 
on all effects of interest.
3 
The Swedish government policy that we use concerned the initial location 
of refugee immigrants. This policy was viable between 1985 and 1991. 
Government authorities placed refugees in localities that were deemed suitable 
according to certain criteria. In practice, the availability of housing was the all-
important factor. Our maintained hypothesis is that, because of the policy, the 
initial location of immigrants is independent of unobserved individual 
characteristics. Hence, this “quasi-experiment” enables us to reexamine the 
question of the importance of ethnic networks in welfare participation. Because 
of the nature of the data we can credibly estimate the main effects of ethnic ties 
per se (quantity) and welfare use among the ethnic peers (quality). Throughout 
                                                      
3 Since Bertrand et al. cannot obtain unbiased estimates on the main effects of quantity and 
quality, their estimates may be missing the most important part of the social network effect. 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the coefficient on the quantity-quality interaction is 
unbiased. There are two problems in this respect. First, differential selection across ethnicities 
may introduce a bias in the coefficient on the interaction term; second, even if differential 
selection across ethnicities is not an issue, the coefficient on the interaction is only unbiased 
subject to the functional form assumption that quantity enters the outcome equation linearly. A 
final potential problem with their strategy is that it is not clear that the coefficient has the inter-
pretation that the authors ascribe to it. In the strict sense, the quantity-quality interaction is just a 
parsimonious way of allowing the coefficient on quantity to vary across ethnicities IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  5 
we hold the observed and unobserved (time-invariant) characteristics of 



























Figure 1: Share of non-OECD immigrant inflow (solid) and stock (dashed) 
located in Stockholm and in the north of Sweden, 1978–1997 
Notes: “Stockholm” refers to the county of Stockholm and “North” to the six northernmost 
counties of Sweden. Authors’ calculations using the LINDA immigrant sample. 
 
The government settlement policy had real consequences for immigrant 
location. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where we plot the share of the 
immigrant inflow and the immigrant stock that resides in Stockholm and the 
north of Sweden respectively. Prior to 1985, refugees were allowed to settle in 
a neighborhood of their own liking. In 1985, the immigrant shares in 
Stockholm and the north of Sweden stood at 36 and 5 percent respectively. By 
1991, the share living in Stockholm had been reduced by more than 3 
percentage points, while the share residing in the north increased by 2 points. 
Thus, the policy initiative clearly increased the dispersion of immigrants across 
Sweden. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. To gauge the importance of 
sorting bias we begin by running simple OLS regressions. Quantity as well as 
quality of the network is positively related to individual welfare participation. 
The IV approach, using characteristics of the initial location as instruments for 
the characteristics of the neighborhood 9–10 years later, reduces the coefficient 
on the size of the enclave to zero while the effect of the quality of the network IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  6 
more than doubles in size. In contrast to Bertrand et al. (2000), we do not find 
that the interaction between quantity and quality is important. The estimate on 
our measure of the quality of contacts implies that the individual probability of 
welfare participation rises by almost 7 percent in response to an increase of the 
welfare use in the ethnic group by 10 percent. The result that what matters is 
enclave characteristics rather than the size is consistent with Edin et al. (2003). 
Edin et al. found that there is a positive return to living in an enclave for low-
skilled refugee immigrants and that there is no effect in the refugee population 
as a whole. Moreover, they concluded that the earnings gain of living in an 
enclave increases with the general labor market position of one’s own ethnic 
group. 
We also run separate regressions for households defined by size, presence of 
kids, and earnings potential. The relative effect of the quality of contacts is 
more or less invariant to different definitions of the estimating sample. Since 
the characteristics that we consider are intimately related to welfare eligibility, 
the results imply that the welfare culture has similar effects across households 
with different predicted eligibility status. 
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. By way of background, 
section 2 gives a description of the institutional setting, discusses whether we 
can treat the policy shift in 1985 as a quasi-experiment, and describes the basic 
features of the Swedish welfare (social assistance) system. Section 3 describes 
the data. In section 4, we report estimates of the effects of networks on welfare 
use. We also investigate whether there is evidence on coefficient heterogeneity. 




Relative to the size of the country Sweden has a substantial immigrant 
population. The share of the foreign born in the total population stood at 11.5 
percent in 2001. As in all developed countries, there is concentration in the 
residential pattern of immigrants – the probability of residing in an “ethnic 
neighborhood” is high.
4 Further, immigrants from developing countries are 
                                                      
4 If we define an ethnic neighborhood as a neighborhood where the share of the ethnic group 
residing in the neighborhood is at least twice as large as the share of the ethnic group in the 
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more likely to live in an ethnic neighborhood. Over the past thirty years the 
majority of immigrants have been refugees or tied movers. 
The second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s saw a massive 
increase in immigration. Concomitantly, there was a rapid increase in the 
immigrant share of the social assistance caseload. During the 1990s, the 
immigrant share of the caseload has hovered around a third and the immigrant 
share of the total budget around 50 percent. This contrasts markedly with the 
situation around 1970 when immigrants were as likely as the native born to 
receive welfare (Lundh et al, 2002). In 2000, the incidence of welfare stood at 
4 percent in the native born population, 6 percent in the non-refugee immigrant 
population, and 32 percent in the refugee immigrant population. Thus, high 
welfare use among immigrants is largely tied to the prevalence of welfare 
receipt in the refugee immigrant population. Different motives for immigration 
and a shift in the integration policy (described below) presumably contribute to 
this fact. 
Refugee immigrants constitute the group of interest in our analysis, and we 
now present the Swedish refugee policy in more detail. Unfortunately, there is 
very little documentation about the practical implementation of the placement 
policy. Therefore, part of the information is based on interviews with place-
ment officers and other officials of the Immigration Board. Following the 
presentation of the placement policy, we give some additional details on the 
Swedish social assistance system. 
 
2.1  The Swedish refugee placement policy 
The placement policy was introduced in 1985.
5 The Immigration Board was 
then given the responsibility of assigning refugee immigrants to an initial 
municipality of residence. The Board was to place all political immigrants, but 
not those who arrived for family reunification reasons. 
The introduction of the placement policy was a reaction to immigrant con-
centration in large cities. The idea was to distribute asylum seekers over a 
larger number of municipalities that had suitable characteristics for reception, 
such as educational and labor market opportunities. At first, the intention was 
                                                                                                                                 
population we find that 42 percent of the average first generation immigrant lived in an ethnic 
neighborhood in 1997. 
5 This section draws on The Committee on Immigration Policy (1996) and The Immigration 
Board (1997). IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  8 
to sign contracts with about 60 municipalities, but due to the increasing number 
of asylum seekers in the late 1980s, a larger number became involved; in 1989, 
277 out of Sweden’s (then) 284 municipalities participated. The criteria that 
initially were supposed to govern placement were abandoned. Instead, the 
availability of housing became the all-important factor. Employment oppor-
tunities were scant in many of the municipalities where refugees were placed. 
To rationalize placement in areas with poor employment prospects the 
integration process was divided into two periods: an introductory period of 18 
months when the immigrant participated in Swedish language courses and lived 
off welfare; then integration into the labor market commenced.
6 
Formally, the policy of assigning refugees to municipalities was in place 
from 1985 to 1994. The strictest application of the assignment policy was 
between 1987 and 1991. For our purposes, this is the most attractive time 
period, since there were few degrees of freedom for the individual immigrant to 
choose the initial place of residence. During 1987–91, the placement rate, i.e., 
the fraction of refugee immigrants assigned an initial municipality of residence 
by the Immigration Board, was close to 90 percent. 
In an earlier paper (see Edin et al., 2003) we argued that the settlement 
policy provides an exogenous source of variation that identifies the causal 
effect of neighborhood characteristics. The essence of the argument is that the 
placement rate was high (in particular during 1987–91), the housing market 
was booming (making it difficult to find vacant housing in attractive areas), 
and there was no interaction between local officers and the refugee in question. 
To substantiate this argument further, let us briefly describe the handling of 
a typical asylum seeker from the border to the final placement. An asylum 
seeker was placed in a refugee center pending a decision from the immigration 
authorities. Refugee centers were distributed all over Sweden and there was no 
correlation between the port of entry and the location of the center. However, 
immigrants were sorted by native language when placed in centers. 
When it came to the municipal placement, weight was given to immigrant 
preferences. Most immigrants, of course, applied for residence in the traditional 
immigrant cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. However, there were 
                                                      
6 In Edin et al. (2004) we evaluate the consequences for the refugees of the policy shift occurring 
in 1985. The policy shift had two components: (i) dispersal of refugees across the country; and 
(ii) increased reliance on income support. We show that the overall effect of the policy shift was 
negative for the refugees subjected to the policy and that the increased focus on income support 
contributed mostly to this negative effect. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  9 
very few housing vacancies in these locations, in particular during the second 
half of the 1980s when the housing market was booming. When the number of 
applicants exceeded the number of available slots, municipal officers may have 
selected the “best” immigrants. There was no interaction between municipal 
officers and refugees, so the selection was purely in terms of observed 
characteristics; language, formal qualifications, and family size seem to have 
been the governing criteria. Preferences were given to highly educated 
individuals and individuals that spoke the same language as some members of 
the resident immigrant stock. Single individuals were particularly difficult to 
place, since small apartments were extremely scarce. 
On the basis of the above description, we think that it is realistic to treat the 
neighborhood assignment as exogenous with respect to the random components 
of the outcomes of interest, conditional on observed characteristics.  
We base our empirical work on immigrants receiving their residence permit 
in 1990 and 1991. The reason for choosing these two years is that we have 
access to population micro data during 1990–2000. Thus, the immigrants will 
have been in Sweden for 9–10 years at the last point when we can observe 
outcomes. 
 
2.2  The Swedish social assistance system 
In comparison with other countries, the Swedish social assistance (SA) system 
is quite generous in terms of the levels of the benefits (Franzén, 2003). Anyone 
who has the right to live in Sweden can also become eligible for SA. There are 
no restrictions in terms of, e.g., household type or time spent in Sweden. 
SA is “the last resort” of the Swedish welfare system. In contrast with e.g. 
unemployment benefits, the receipt of SA is means-tested and may require that 
assets are realized. Since 1998 there is a national norm concerning the monthly 
income level guaranteed by SA. The norm is differentiated with respect to the 
number of household members and their ages. The regulations also grant com-
pensation for other “reasonable” costs (e.g. housing and commuting), which 
results in a substantial amount of discretion. The discretion also applies to 
whether the individual is required to realize assets before receiving SA. In 
general, the implementation appears to be stricter for long-term than for short-
term SA receipt (The National Board of Health and Welfare, 2002). 
SA receipt is also more common in some household types than in others: 
about one quarter of all single females with kids received SA in 2001. At the 
same time point, the fraction of all households receiving SA was 6 percent. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  10
More than 30 percent of the recipients were long-term dependent – i.e. received 
SA for at least ten months during 2001. Since 1985, SA is used for supporting 
newly-arrived refugees and tied movers. As already mentioned, SA is much 
more prevalent in parts of the immigrant population than in other groups. 
Excluding recent refugees, payments to immigrant households accounted for 
close to fifty percent of the money spent on SA.
7 A contributing reason to long-
term dependence particularly among immigrants is non-eligibility for other 
types of welfare payments, e.g. unemployment insurance. About one third of 
those who received SA in 2001 were unemployed but not eligible for unem-




3  Data and identification strategy 
In this section we describe the data and the sample selections (section 3.1). 
Then we present the characteristics of individuals assigned to particular 
neighborhoods and discuss our identification strategy (section 3.2). 
 
3.1  Data and sample selection 
The empirical analysis is based on population micro data collected by the IFAU 
(Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation) – the IFAU data base. The data 
base consists of a collection of register information such as information from 
the income tax registers and population registers. The data are available from 
1990 until 2000. The great advantage of using these data is that we can 
calculate measures of the characteristics of the population from each source 
country at the neighborhood level. These measures are free of the small sample 
error that will plague all estimates deduced from samples of the population. We 
can thus calculate measures of neighborhood characteristics for much finer 
geographical units than in our previous work.
8 
                                                      
7 Here, an immigrant household is defined as a household where both adult members (if appli-
cable) are foreign-born. 
8 Due to measurement error considerations, neighborhoods were identified at the municipality 
level in Edin et al. (2003) and we used the number of foreign citizens rather than the number of 
individuals from a particular source country. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  11 
A potential drawback of the data is that small source countries are aggre-
gated with other source countries for confidentiality reasons. In the appendix 
we present the origin countries, or the country aggregates, of the individuals 
included in the analysis. For the most part we think that these aggregations of 
countries are rather innocuous.
9 We have also examined whether these 
aggregations pose a problem for us by estimating regressions including only 
countries that we can identify uniquely. The results reported in section 4 only 
change marginally. 
All individual variables in our analysis are based on register information. 
Welfare receipt and some of the other characteristics (gender, age, education, 
and family composition) are obtained from the income tax registers, which also 
contain information on country of birth and year of immigration from the 
population registers. Throughout we use ethnicity as a short hand for country of 
origin, or country aggregate, although it is the latter information that the data 
contain. 
Neighborhood characteristics are measured at the parish level.
10 In 2000, 
there were 2,482 parishes and the median parish had 590 inhabitants of 
working age. However, the median individual lived in a parish with 8,660 
inhabitants. For our refugee sample this figure is even higher: 14,148 in 2000. 
Descriptive statistics, along with the definition of some of the key variables, are 
reported in the Appendix. 
We cannot identify refugee immigrants directly from our data. Instead we 
identify them by country of origin. As a general rule we include immigrants 
from countries outside Western Europe that were not members of the OECD as 
of 1985. The only exception from this rule is Turkey, which is included since it 
was the origin of a substantial inflow of refugee immigrants during the period. 
We exclude persons belonging to a household with an adult already residing 
in Sweden, since they were likely to have immigrated as family members and, 
consequently, were not placed. We base our analysis on individuals aged 18–55 
at the time of entry into Sweden. Lastly, we focus on the immigration waves 
during 1990–91 for reasons outlined above. 
                                                      
9 Some aggregations are clearly unfortunate, such as aggregating Israel with the rest of the 
Middle East. But note that individuals born in Israel represent a very small share of the sample 
(0.5 % according to the estimates in table A.3) so they will have little influence on the estimates.  
10 Refugee immigrants were assigned to an apartment so, in principle, there is scope for defining 
even smaller “neighborhoods”. However, the parish is the smallest geographical unit that we can 
identify in the data. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  12
Imposing all of these restrictions we are left with a sample of 22,556 
individuals. There are 889 parishes of assignment. Most immigrants are of 
Middle Eastern (e.g. Iran and Iraq) or African origin (e.g. Ethiopia and 
Somalia); see table A3 for more details. 
Another feature of the data that may be relevant for our analysis is that we 
observe the region of residence at the end of the year. Thus, the observed initial 
location may differ from the actual initial placement if individuals move during 
their first year. This introduces a measurement error in initial placement. In 
Edin et al. (2003) we investigated the importance of this problem by using a 
weighting scheme based on aggregate data on municipal refugee reception 
from the Immigration Board. The weighted estimates were very similar to the 
non-weighted ones, suggesting that the measurement error is not a big concern. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to perform a similar analysis in this paper, since 
there is no information on refugee reception at the parish level. 
 
3.2  Issues related to the identification strategy 
Our identification strategy relies on the presumption that the characteristics of 
the initial placement are independent of unobserved individual characteristics 
given the observed ones. In table 1, we present some information related to this 
assumption. The table reports the mean characteristics of individuals that were 
assigned to neighborhoods characterized by a high and low degree of welfare 
dependence, respectively. To get this division of the data, we first regressed the 
share of the ethnic group on welfare in the neighborhood on a set of ethnicity 
dummies. Then we divided the residual distribution into quartiles. The top 
quartile is referred to as highly welfare dependent neighborhoods, while the 
bottom quartile is comprised of neighborhoods where welfare dependence is 
low. 
Table 1 shows that individuals are systematically sorted into neighborhoods. 
Bigger families and less educated individuals were more likely to be assigned 
to neighborhoods where welfare dependence was high. This sorting on 
observed characteristics may cause concern. Still, the argument we are making 
is that assignment was random conditional on observed characteristics and 
placement was explicitly conditional on education and family size. We have 
also probed deeper into this issue and looked at the distribution of 
characteristics that were not explicitly linked to placement across the two types 
of neighborhoods conditional on family size and education. It turns out that 
there are no differences in terms of marital status and age. Gender is still IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  13 
systematically different across the two kinds of neighborhoods, however. 
Finally, note, that we can estimate separate regressions for different 
demographic groups; this is of great interest in its own right, but it is also a way 
to validate the conditional independence argument that we are making. 
Remember that, e.g., singles individuals were very difficult to place since 
vacant small apartments were extremely scarce. This suggests that it is very 
unlikely that singles were able to influence placement, i.e., they were most 
likely “exogenously placed”. 
 
Table 1: Individual characteristics by type of neighborhood assignment 
  Neighborhood where welfare dependence is… 
  high low 
Female 0.42  0.47 
Age 30.7  30.6 
 (8.0)  (8.4) 
Years of schooling at assignment  10.5  11.1 
 (2.8)  (2.8) 
Years of schooling in 2000  11.6  11.9 
 (3.1)  (3.2) 
Married and cohabiting  0.46  0.32 
# kids  1.3  0.8 
 (1.6)  (1.3) 
Notes: The neighborhood classification is based on the variation within ethnicity. Characteristics 
that are time-varying are generally measured at the time of assignment. The exception from this 
rule is education where there is a substantial amount of missing values at the time of entry. 
 
It may also be of interest to have an idea about the kind of neighborhoods 
the refugees were assigned to. In table 2 we compare the neighborhood of 
assignment with the typical neighborhood of residence in the Swedish pop-
ulation. Table 2 shows that the refugees were assigned to more populous areas, 
with a greater share of immigrants as well as welfare recipients, and a lower 
employment rate. The differences relative to the overall population concurs 
with our understanding of how the placement policy was implemented. Still, it 
is worth noting that the differences across neighborhoods are much smaller 
than if we would have based the comparison on the residential distribution of 
refugees after 9–10 years in Sweden (i.e. in 2000) to that of the overall pop-
ulation at the same point in time. 
Given that the characteristics of the initial placement are exogenous (at least 
conditionally) we can potentially use them as instruments for the characteristics IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  14
of the neighborhood 9–10 years later. This implies that the predictive power of 
the instruments derives mainly from individuals who stayed on in the assigned 




Table 2: Characteristics of assigned neighborhoods, means 
  Refugees Overall  population 
Size of neighborhood (population)  10,614  9,687 
Immigrant density (%)  15  12 
Share of welfare recipients (%)  8  6 
Employment rate (%)  77  79 
Notes: The neighborhood characteristics are measured at the time of assignment. 
 
What are the characteristics of those who stayed relative to those who 
moved? How many moved on to another neighborhood? In table A2 we present 
descriptive statistics by mobility status. We first note that 74 percent of the 
sample has moved to another parish within nine to ten years after entering 
Sweden. The rate of mobility may seem high; however, it is a generic feature of 
the Swedish immigration experience that there is substantial mobility out of the 
initial location; see Åslund (2000). Despite the high rate of mobility out of the 
assigned parish, our instruments – i.e. the characteristics of the assignment – 
have substantial predictive power in the first stage regressions; we return to this 
issue in the presentation of the estimates. 
The differences in individual characteristics are broadly in line with what 
one would expect in any analysis of mobility. Movers are more likely to be 
young and single, and have more education than stayers. There are some 
differences across source regions. Refugee immigrants from the African Horn 
and Iran tend to move to a greater extent than immigrants from other regions. 
In terms of the local characteristics 9–10 years after immigration, movers 
tend to live in neighborhoods where there is a greater number of fellow 
countrymen and a greater prevalence of welfare receipt among these country-
men. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that movers reduced their exposure 
to welfare receiving countrymen by moving (not shown in table); this exposure 
was thus even higher in the neighborhood of assignment. 
Using the characteristics of the initial placement as instruments in an IV 
approach also requires the assumption that these characteristics are excludable 
from the outcome equation when conditioning on the characteristics of the 
current residence. If this exclusion restriction does not hold we have mis-IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  15 
specified the equation for movers. Therefore, it is useful to look at the timing of 
the moves for the sub-population of movers. It turns out that the vast majority 
of movers leave the assigned neighborhood shortly after assignment. 80 percent 
of movers left the initial placement within three years and 90 percent of movers 
have left for another municipality within five years. The exclusion restriction 
we are making thus amounts to saying that the history of neighborhood 
characteristics, say, five years back, has no direct effect on the outcome of 
interest. We think this is a rather palatable assumption and hence we focus on 
the IV results in the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, we also discuss alter-





4  The effects of ethnic enclaves and 
welfare cultures 
There is much work – especially in sociology (e.g. Portes, 1987) – that 
emphasizes network effects. According to this literature, there is an upside and 
a downside to living in an enclave. On the one hand, the enclave may represent 
a network that increases the opportunities for gainful trade in the labor market 
and disseminates valuable information on, e.g., job opportunities. On the other 
hand, the enclave may fail to provide positive role models (Wilson, 1987) and 
may provide information on welfare eligibility (Bertrand et al., 2000). 
Before proceeding to the results it is useful to make clear what kind of 
mechanisms the network effects we are estimating will capture. Although we 
argue that our estimates do not suffer from the simultaneity bias usually 
encountered in the literature, we do not attempt to distinguish between 
endogenous and exogenous social interactions.
12 Thus, an effect of the quality 
of the network on individual welfare receipt may reflect the attitudes, behavior, 
and the information of the network, as well as the exogenous characteristics of 
the network. 
                                                      
11 If initial exposure matters on top of current exposure, i.e., if there is “scarring”, the exclusion 
restriction is not correct; see Åslund and Rooth (2003) for an analysis of scarring in this context.  
12 The terminology comes from Manski (1993) and Moffitt (2000). IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  16
In the setting we are considering, however, the network will probably not 
function as a provider of information on the workings of the welfare system in 
general. The reason is that an ingredient of the placement policy was that all 
refugee immigrants were placed on welfare by default. So the refugees that we 
are considering should already know how the system in general worked. 
Nevertheless, information may still be part of the story. There is a considerable 
amount of discretion on the part of case workers. So, information on local 
variations in the implementation of the rules may well be provided by the 
network. 
Another distinguishing feature of our study is that we are looking at how the 
welfare use of new entrants into the country is affected by the stock already 
residing in the country. These new immigrants may be particularly susceptible 
to social interactions and network effects. New entrants are probably more 
susceptible to the characteristics and behavior of their peer group than 
individuals that have been on the market for some time. 
The remainder of this section is devoted to our estimation results. Section 
4.1 presents a set of baseline estimates. We examine whether individual wel-
fare dependence is causally affected by ethnic concentration and welfare use in 
the ethnic group. We view ethnic concentration as a measure of contact 
availability and welfare use in the ethnic group as a measure of the “quality” of 
contacts. Section 4.2 relaxes some of the assumptions of the baseline 
specification. Section 4.3 examines whether the effects of quality and quantity 
vary by the severity of welfare dependence, and in section 4.4 we examine 
whether the effects are different in various sub-sets of the population. 
 
4.1 Baseline  estimates 
As outlined earlier, the basic strategy to free the estimates of simultaneity bias 
between welfare use and the size and characteristics of the local population is 
to use the placement policy to obtain instruments for local variables. In effect, 
we use variables pertaining to the initial (assigned) neighborhood as instru-
ments for neighborhood characteristics nine to ten years later. Our maintained 
assumption is that the placement policy is independent of unobserved 
individual characteristics. Moreover, we assume that (initial) location does not 
have permanent effects on outcomes. 
Our basic specification of the outcome equation is the following 
 
  ipct t c p pct it ipct W W ε δ δ δ α β + + + + + =
0 0 ln X  (1) IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  17 
 
where i indexes individuals, p parishes, c countries of origin, and t time.  0 p  
denotes the initial parish of assignment and  0 t  is the year of immigration. The 
dependent variable equals unity if the individual is a member of a welfare 
receiving household in  2000 = t and zero otherwise; households are classified 
as being on welfare as long as they have received a positive amount during the 
year.
13 We standardize for a set of individual characteristics X, containing 
gender, age, age squared, marital status, education, and dummies for the 
number of kids in the household. In order to control for omitted variables, the 
regression includes a full set of country of origin fixed effects ( c δ ), 
immigration year fixed effects (
0 t δ ), and fixed effects for the assigned parish 
(
0 p δ ). We only control for the assigned neighborhood, as the coefficients on 
the resident neighborhood in period t may be endogenous because of sorting 
and instrumenting the full set of parish effects is simply too taxing on the data. 
Welfare use for individual i of ethnic group c is also related to the number of 
(other) welfare recipients among immigrants from the particular ethnic group in 
parish  p ( pct W ).
14 Notice that the coefficient on the number of welfare 
recipients in the ethnic group is identified since it varies across ethnic groups 
within parishes (and across parishes within ethnic group). The number of 
welfare recipients in the ethnic group reflects both the quality and quantity of 
contacts. We also decompose this measure and attach separate coefficients on 
the component parts, i.e.,  = pct W ln α pct W E W ) ln( α pct E E ln α + . Using this de-
composition we can in principle test whether quantity ( pct E ) or quality 
pct E W ) (  is most important for individual behavior. 
We begin by estimating equation (1) for the full sample. The first stage 
equations in the IV (2SLS) procedure, amount to regressing, e.g.,  cpt W ln  on 
0 0 ln t cp W and the remaining explanatory variables in (1). Thus, in this instance, 
we regress the number of welfare recipients from ethnicity c in the individuals 
current place of residence (p) on the number of welfare recipients from 
                                                      
13 Notice that we estimate a linear probability model rather than a logit or a probit. The main 
reason is that we want to apply instrumental variables, which is more cumbersome in a non-
linear model. 
14 In calculating the characteristics of the ethnic group in a particular neighborhood, we exclude 
the inflow (and their family members), i.e., the individuals in our analysis sample. If the indivi-
duals in our analysis sample and the population for which we calculate neighborhood charac-
teristics would be identical, then the mechanics of the linear probability model drives the 
coefficient on the neighborhood characteristic towards unity. Given that we exclude the inflow 
there is nothing mechanical about the estimates. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  18
ethnicity c in the assigned neighborhood ( 0 p ) at the time of immigration ( 0 t ). 
This first stage regression has strong predictive power: the number of welfare 
recipients in the ethnic group in the assigned parish enters the equation with a 
coefficient of 0.17 and a t-ratio of 16.06. All first stage regressions that we 
have run suggest that the instruments have substantial predictive power. 
Table 3 reports the results for the full sample where the outcome of interest 
is the probability of welfare receipt. Columns (1) and (3) report OLS estimates 
where we treat the characteristics of the neighborhood as exogenous. Column 
(2) and (4) report the results of the IV procedure outlined above. Column (5), 
finally, reports the reduced form results, i.e., the results from the regression of 
individual welfare use at time t on, inter alia, the characteristics of the assigned 
neighborhood at time  0 t . 
 
 













ln(# welfare recipients from same ethnic group)  .032  .010       
 (.003)  (.023)       
ln(fraction of welfare recipients in ethnic group)      .056  .263  .021 
      (.006) (.087) (.007) 
ln(# individuals from same ethnic group)      .028  –.004  –.004 
      (.003) (.023) (.004) 
# individuals  22,556 22,556 22,556 22,556 22,556 
Mean of the dependent variable  0.390 0.390 0.390 0.390 0.390 
Standard error of regression  .43 .43 .43 .45 .44 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for (a quadratic in) age, marital 
status, cohabitant status, dummies for #kids in the household, educational attainment, country of 
birth fixed effect, neighborhood fixed effects, and immigration year fixed effects. In table A4 we 
report the full set of estimates for the specifications in columns (3) and (4). IV estimation is by 
2SLS using the characteristics of the assigned neighborhoods as instruments for the 
characteristics in 2000. Characteristics of the neighborhood refer to time t in columns (1)-(4) and 
to time t0 in column (5). Robust variance estimates, allowing for correlation across individuals 
residing in the same parish. 
 
According to the OLS estimates in column (1) there is a positive association 
between the number of welfare recipients in the neighborhood and individual 
welfare use. A doubling of the number of recipients from the individual’s 
ethnic group raises welfare dependence by three percentage points (see column 
1). According to the corresponding IV estimate, the OLS coefficient appears to 
be upward biased.  IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  19 
The bias of OLS is more striking when we turn to the decompositions in 
columns (3) and (4), where the IV estimates are significantly different from the 
OLS estimates. Nevertheless, the qualitative conclusion is similar is one 
respect: Both sets of estimates imply that the quality of contacts is more 
important than contact availability. Moreover, there is a downward bias in the 
OLS estimate on the quality of contacts and an upward bias in the coefficient 
on contact availability. In fact, there is literally no effect of contact availability 
in economic as well as statistical terms.
15 
The fact that there is a positive sorting bias in the OLS estimate on ethnic 
concentration is consistent with our findings in Edin et al. (2003): according to 
the IV-estimates there was no effect on earnings when all skill groups were 
pooled together and a positive effect for the low-skilled; the corresponding 
OLS estimates were all negative.  
The sorting pattern implied by the comparison of the OLS and IV 
coefficients on ln pct E W ) (  may seem surprising. We argued earlier that the 
reflection problem causes an upward bias in the simple OLS estimate. Now, 
since equation (1) includes neighborhood and country of origin fixed effects it 
is more sophisticated than commonly encountered specifications, where 
simultaneity concerns apply directly. Excluding these fixed effects, the OLS 
estimate on the fraction of welfare recipients from the ethnic group is almost 
double the size of the IV estimate in column (4). 
Nevertheless, it is relevant to ask: What kind of sorting story motivates the 
increase in the IV estimate relative to the OLS estimate on the fraction of 
welfare recipients? Our interpretation goes as follows. Think of a world where 
sorting bias is driven by the behavior of the low-skilled (in the unobserved 
                                                      
15 We have subjected the baseline specification to a number of sensitivity checks. One of the 
most important ones concerns the possibility of a remaining correlation between unobserved 
individual characteristics and the initial neighborhood characteristics that we use as instruments. 
Although we have taken due care to exclude the individuals in the sample and their household 
members when calculating neighborhood characteristics, one may be concerned that the behavior 
of the sampled individuals influences the surrounding environment. This is a social interactions 
model implying that there is feedback from the studied individuals onto the remaining members 
of the network. To investigate whether this was an issue, we restricted the analysis to individuals 
entering the country in 1991. As instruments we used neighborhood characteristics in 1990. The 
point estimates of the network effects were actually slightly higher using this approach than in 
our baseline approach. Thus endogenous feedback from the studied individuals to the 
neighborhood characteristics is not a concern. Furthermore, the results are not sensitive to 
outliers and the functional form. Using the actual share of welfare recipients (rather than the log 
of the share) produces the same qualitative results.   IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  20
sense) and suppose the main motivation for these individuals is to gain 
employment (or stay off welfare).
16 For these low-ability individuals it is then 
rational to opt for a high-skill neighborhood because such a neighborhood 
increases employment opportunities and reduces the risk of ending up on 
welfare (see Edin et al., 2003). To substantiate this story we performed the 
following exercise. As a measure of the quality of the network we introduced 
the fraction of employed members in the ethnic group rather than the share of 
the group on welfare. Then we re-estimated the equations using OLS as well as 
IV. The results were consistent with those reported in table 3. In both the OLS 
and the IV the share of employed members of the ethnic group entered the 
equations significantly negative. Moreover, the OLS coefficient is biased 
downward in absolute value by a factor of almost five, suggesting that the low-
skilled indeed sort into high-skilled neighborhoods.
17 
The magnitudes of the social network effects reported in table 3 strike us as 
large. The IV estimates in column (4) imply that individual welfare receipt 
increases by 2.6 percentage points in response to 10 percent increase in the 
share of the ethnic group on welfare; this corresponds to a relative increase of 
6.7 percent. Alternatively, we can evaluate the estimates at a point corre-
sponding to the typical variation available in the data. To do that, we calculated 
the weighted average of the standard deviation in the fraction of welfare 
recipients within ethnicity across neighborhoods. This calculation implies that 
in response to a standard deviation increase in the (log of the) fraction of 
welfare recipients (0.55) the individual probability of welfare receipt rises by 
14.5 percentage points. 
                                                      
16 The characteristics of the neighborhood may be particularly important for low-skill 
individuals. High-skill individuals presumably make their way in any kind of environment. 
Notice also that this kind of mobility pattern is consistent with what we observe in the data. 
Those who moved entered neighborhoods where welfare receipt in the ethnic group was lower 
than in the assigned neighborhood.  
17 A relevant question to ask is the following: What happens if one controls for the ethnic 
employment rate in addition to the share of the ethnic group on welfare? The answer to this 
question is that the employment rate and the welfare participation rate in the initial assignment 
both have independent and statistically significant effects on welfare use 9–10 years later. 
Relative to the reduced form in column (5), the coefficient on ethnic welfare use is reduced by 
almost 25 percent. We prefer the parsimonious specification in column (5) since the extended 
specification does not really facilitate interpretation. The employment rate and the welfare parti-
cipation rate are so intimately related and both measures could reflect basically the same thing. 
Even if controlling for the ethnic employment rate would reduce the coefficient on ethnic welfare 
use to zero, this does not imply that behavior and information are unimportant for individual 
welfare use.  IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  21 
 
4.2  Relaxing some assumptions of the baseline 
specification 
As noted earlier, the IV estimates require the exclusion restriction that the 
characteristics of the initial placement do not have permanent effects on the 
outcome. The reduced form estimates, reported in column (5), impose no such 
restriction. They can be seen as a test of whether the characteristics and 
behavior of the surrounding environment matter for individual outcomes. 
Given the estimates reported in column (4), it is unsurprising to see that the 
size of the enclave has no effect on individual welfare use – what matters is the 
share of welfare recipients in the ethnic community. 
The “reduced form” relationship between individual welfare receipt in 2000 
and the characteristics of the assigned neighborhood can also be interpreted in 
the context of the refugee placement policy. It seems that exposing individuals 
to welfare-intense environments initially made them more likely to become 
long-term welfare recipients. Placing individuals in a neighborhood where 
welfare receipt in the ethnic group was ten percent higher than normal 
increased the individual probability of “long-run” welfare use by 0.2 percen-
tage points. 
Moreover, the reduced form also lends itself to a structural interpretation. 
Suppose we were interested in the question: What is the long-run effect 
(cumulated over 9–10 years) of placing individuals in environments with 
marginally higher welfare use?
18 If one is interested in this question one should 
correct the estimates for the fact that not all individuals complied with the 
assigned treatment. In fact, 74 percent moved on to a different neighborhood 
than the assigned one. The answer to the above question is thus obtained by 
dividing the reduced form coefficient by the probability of remaining in the 
assigned neighborhood (0.26). So, if ethnic welfare use was ten percent higher 
than normal in the assigned neighborhood, the long-run effect – cumulated over 
9–10 years – is to increase the individual probability of welfare use by 0.8 
percentage points. 
The baseline specification is based on the rather extreme assumption that it 
is only the current characteristics of the ethnic community that matters for 
                                                      
18 Notice that this is a different question that the one implicitly posed in equation (1). In equation 
(1) we purport to estimate the contemporaneous relationship between neighborhood charac-
teristics and individual welfare use. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  22
current welfare receipt. Of course, we are not literal believers in this assump-
tion – it seems plausible that the history of neighborhood characteristics is also 
of some importance for welfare receipt at time t. We have examined whether 
history matters in a variety of ways. The results of these analyses suggest the 
history of neighborhood characteristics has some influence but their importance 
declines rather rapidly.
19    
We have also investigated the possibility that the interaction of quality and 
quantity is important; c.f. Bertrand et al. (2000). In other words, does the 
impact of frequent welfare receipt in the ethnic group vary with the size of the 
group? Adding the interaction between ln(size of the ethnic group) and 
ln(fraction of welfare recipients in the ethnic group) to specification (4) gives 
an estimate of 0.014 (0.034) on the interaction term, suggesting that the answer 
to this question is no. The main effect of quality is far more important than the 
interaction between contact availability and quality. 
 
4.3  Do the neighborhood effects differ depending on the 
severity of welfare dependence? 
We have so far used a strict measure of welfare receipt: if the individual 
(household) receives any amount of welfare at any time during a particular 
year, he or she is classified as a welfare recipient. Since it is possible that 
neighborhood effects differ depending on the severity of welfare dependence, 
table 4 presents results for alternative thresholds for welfare receipt. The 
alternative thresholds are based on the ratio of received welfare to the eligi-
bility limit for the household in question, i.e. the income guaranteed by the 
welfare system.
20 
The first column of the table contains the baseline estimates, whereas 
specifications (1)–(4) use increasingly higher thresholds for welfare receipt. 
                                                      
19 For instance, we have estimated models assuming that the history is as important as the current 
characteristics. Under this assumption, we get a specification where it is the cumulative exposure 
to varying enclave characteristics that matters for welfare receipt at time t. Maintaining the 
assumption that the initial exposure is excludable from the outcome equation, conditional on 
cumulative exposure, we can estimate the alternative specification using standard IV. We have 
estimated such models for a variety of lags included in the measure of cumulative exposure. 
Cumulating exposure two years back, we get an IV estimate on the share of welfare recipients of 
0.09. 
20 The eligibility limit is calculated from the national social assistance standard combined with 
information on household composition. It also includes estimated housing costs. The accuracy of 
the eligibility measure is discussed further in section 4.4. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  23 
The estimated effects are quite similar regardless of the threshold. There is a 
tendency to smaller estimates with higher thresholds in the absolute sense. 
Alternatively, one may wish to normalize the coefficients by the mean of the 
dependent variable which suggests that the estimates are increasing in the 
relative sense (third row from bottom). However, none of the coefficients are 
significantly different from one another. As in the baseline case, enclave size 
appears to be unrelated to the outcomes. Thus, these results suggest that net-
work effects are just as pertinent for severe welfare dependence as they are for 
overall welfare use. 
 
 
Table 4: Alternative thresholds for welfare use 








ln(fraction of welfare recipients in  ethnic  group)  .263 .227 .189 .179 .155 
  (.085) (.081) (.076) (.077) (.064) 
ln(# individuals from same ethnic  group)  –.004  –.002  .001 .011 .015 
  (.023) (.022) (.021) (.020) (.018) 
# individuals  22,556 22,556 22,556 22,556 22,556 
Standard error of regression  .44 .43 .41 .39 .36 
Mean of  the dependent variable  .390 .324 .267 .218 .174 
Relative effect of “enclave quality”  .674 .701 .708 .821 .891 
Fraction of “not eligible” receiving welfare  .210 .127 .078 .049 .031 
Fraction of “eligible” receiving welfare  .676 .636 .568 .486 .400 
Notes: In specification (1), an individual is classified as welfare recipient if the amount received 
is more than 0.1 of the eligibility limit for his/her household. In specifications (2)–(4) this 
threshold is set to 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4 respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions 
control for (a quadratic in) age, marital status, cohabitant status, dummies for #kids in the 
household, educational attainment, country of birth fixed effect, neighborhood fixed effects, and 
immigration year fixed effects. IV estimation is by 2SLS using the characteristics of the assigned 
neighborhoods as instruments for the characteristics in 2000. Robust variance estimates, allowing 
for correlation across individuals residing in the same parish. Note that the alternative threshold 
for welfare receipt pertains only to the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the 
same in all specifications. 
 
4.4  Do the effects vary across groups? 
In this section we report estimates for different sub-groups. There are three 
main reasons for doing this. First, welfare eligibility is determined by 
household economic status and welfare generosity is a function of household 
characteristics: young single mothers may have easier access to welfare than a IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  24
couple without kids.
21 Second, we know from the description of the placement 
policy that the argument for exogenous placement is stronger for certain demo-
graphic groups. Third, there is also a methodological twist to running separate 
regressions for different sub-groups. Wooldridge (2003) has recently shown 
that conventional two-stage least squares estimates (2SLS), including the inter-
actions between the endogenous variable(s) and the exogenous characteristics, 
consistently estimates an average treatment effect (if there is treatment 
heterogeneity) under weaker conditions than the “plug-in” estimators proposed 
by Heckman and Vytlacil (1998).
22 Running separate regressions for groups 
with certain traits is a convenient way of allowing for interactions between the 
trait in question and the endogenous variable. 
We estimated the specification of column (4) in table 3 for sub-samples 
divided along two dimensions: (i) singles and cohabitants; (ii) kids present in 
the household or not. All in all, this yielded nine sub-samples (including the 
full sample and sub-samples divided only in one dimension). Welfare use is 
prevalent in all kinds of households; for instance, 30 percent of singles without 
kids received welfare payments during 2000. This number is much higher for 
singles with kids (54 percent), but, in contrast to the US, welfare use is clearly 
not restricted to single mothers only. 
Table 5 presents a selection of these regression results. It reports the 
estimates for the full sample, for households were there is at least one kid 
present, for households containing only one adult member (but kids may be 
present), and for singles with kids. The main message of the estimations is that 
the characteristics of the enclave have similar effects across different types of 
households. In all kinds of households it seems that the quality of contacts is 
what matters for welfare use. Although, the point estimates on quality differs 
somewhat, the relative effects presented in the bottom row of the table are 
practically constant and hover around 0.7. The lack of statistical significance 
for singles with kids is presumably driven by sample size relative to the vast 
number of fixed effects that we are estimating. 
 
 
                                                      
21 Note, though, that there is no necessary link between household type and the importance of the 
peer effects studied here. 
22 Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) criticized applying standard 2SLS to a setting where there is 
treatment heterogeneity, because such an approach either requires that there is no heterogeneity 
or that individuals do not act on heterogeneity. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  25 










ln(fraction of welfare recipients in ethnic  .263  .295  .251  .382 
group) (.085)  (.115)  (.129)  (.265) 
ln(# individuals from same ethnic  group)  –.004 –.023 –.013 –.043 
 (.023)  (.030)  (.039)  (.071) 
# individuals  22,556  14,266  9,565  2,815 
Standard error of regression  .44 .45 .45 .47 
Mean of the dependent variable .390  .442  .368  .536 
Relative effect of “enclave quality”  .674  .667  .682  .713 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In general, the regressions control for (a quadratic in) age, 
marital status, cohabitant status, dummies for #kids in the household, educational attainment, 
country of birth fixed effect, neighborhood fixed effects, and immigration year fixed effects. All 
regressions are estimated by 2SLS using the characteristics of the assigned neighborhoods as 
instruments for the characteristics in 2000. Robust variance estimates, allowing for correlation 
across individuals residing in the same parish. 
 
We noted earlier that singles are the ones that were most likely to be 
exogenously placed. Therefore, it is reassuring to see that the neighborhood 
effect estimated for singles is virtually identical to the one estimated for the full 
sample. 
It would be interesting to decompose the neighborhood effect on welfare 
utilization into the effect on the take-up rate, i.e. welfare use conditional on 
eligibility, and the effect on welfare eligibility. Although interesting, this is a 
very hard question. Estimating the effect on take-up by conditioning on eligi-
bility (or income) directly in the equations is likely to be unproductive. The 
reason for this is that the individual unobserved components that influence 
welfare receipt probably also influence income, i.e., income is not exogenous 
to the availability of welfare. Moreover, any attempt to instrument eligibility 
(or income) will have to rely on an exclusion restriction that is bound to be 
arbitrary. Another approach would be to back-out the effect on take-up using 
estimated effects on welfare use and welfare eligibility. However, there is no 
information on eligibility in the data and there seems to a good deal of 
discretion on the part of case-workers in determining the eligibility. 
Nevertheless, we have made an attempt to estimate eligibility from obser-
vations on annual household income. There are several sources of measurement 
error in this estimate. First, welfare eligibility is determined by household 
income during a particular month rather than the full year. Second, we are 
unable to include exact housing expenditure or other extra costs covered by 
welfare. Third, we do not observe assets that may hinder welfare eligibility. IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  26
The two latter problems are related to the discretionary element of the welfare 
system, which may of course also operate in other dimensions. A flavor of the 
extent of measurement error was given already in table 4.  With our baseline 
definition of welfare receipt, 21 percent of those that we classify as “non-
eligible” are actually receiving welfare. When we consider more severe forms 
of welfare dependence the extent of misclassification drops but it does not go 
away completely; see the last column of table 4.
23 
All in all, whether the neighborhood effects vary by eligibility status is a 
very hard question to answer. What we can do is ask whether the neighborhood 
effects vary by earnings potential (i.e. their predicted eligibility status). This is 
what is done in table 6, where we present estimates by quintiles of the 
predicted earnings distribution. The basis for the earnings prediction is a re-
gression using the stock of individuals from refugee source countries residing 
in Sweden in 2000. This earnings regression includes a standard set of co-
variates (educational attainment, gender, age, age squared, country of birth 
etc.). The coefficients from the regressions are used to predict earnings in the 
sample that we are analyzing.
24 
The labor market success of refugee immigrants in Sweden has been rather 
poor during the 1990s; see Edin et al. (2000). Therefore, one may fear that even 
a refugee immigrant predicted to be in the top quintile has low earnings relative 
to natives. However, this is not quite the case. A refugee immigrant predicted 
to be on the 75
th percentile in the analysis sample is ranked on the 40
th 
percentile in the native earnings distribution. So, the observed characteristics of 
the refugees spans some range in the native earnings distribution. They are not 
all predicted to be low-income earners. 
Table 6 conveys a message that we have seen several times before. It is the 
quality of the enclave that matters for individual welfare use. The fraction of 
welfare users in the community has a positive and significant effect on indivi-
dual welfare use for all skill groups; the size of the enclave has no effect. The 
magnitude of the estimate on quality declines in more skilled groups. But the 
                                                      
23 We have made an attempt to examine whether welfare eligibility is causally affected by 
neighborhood characteristics. This analysis seems to convey a similar message as our analysis of 
welfare use. However, the IV estimates were imprecise, which presumably reflects the sub-
stantial difficulties associated with measuring eligibility. 
24 To avoid omitted variable bias, we included a set of municipality fixed effects in estimating 
the regressions. However, earnings were predicted as if all individuals resided in the same muni-
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estimates are not significantly different from one another and the relative 
effects of an increase in quality are remarkably stable. Thus, the predicted eligi-
bility status of the households does not matter much for the effect of neigh-
borhood characteristics on welfare use. 
 
Table 6: Estimates by predicted earnings. Dependent variable: welfare use 
Predicted earnings quintile  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(fraction of welfare recipients in  ethnic  group)  .283 .255 .199 .165 .160 
  (.083) (.087) (.063) (.085) (.062) 
ln(# individuals from same ethnic  group)  .003 –.038 .025 –.011 .000 
  (.022) (.025) (.024) (.028) (.022) 
# individuals  4,512 4,512 4,511 4,512 4,509 
Standard error of regression  .49 .51 .49 .48 .43 
Mean of the dependent variable  .553 .412 .374 .349 .262 
Relative effect of “enclave quality”  .512 .619 .532 .473 .611 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for (a quadratic in) age, marital 
status, cohabitant status, dummies for #kids in the household, educational attainment, country of 
birth fixed effect, neighborhood fixed effects, and immigration year fixed effects. IV estimation 
is by 2SLS using the characteristics of the assigned neighborhoods as instruments for the 
characteristics in 2000. Robust variance estimates, allowing for correlation across individuals 
residing in the same parish. The “relative effect of enclave quality” is the point estimate of the 
first row divided by the mean of the dependent variable in the respective quintile. 
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
The main purpose of this paper has been to examine whether the size and 
characteristics of the enclave has a causal effect on welfare use. To this end, we 
have made use of an immigrant policy initiative in Sweden, when government 
authorities distributed refugee immigrants across locales in a way that we argue 
is exogenous. This policy initiative provides a quasi-experiment, which allows 
us to handle the endogeneity problem due to the individuals’ residential choice. 
Throughout we have distinguished between the quantity of contacts (the size of 
the enclave) and quality of contacts (the welfare culture). 
The empirical analysis suggests two main conclusions. First, we find that 
the quality of contacts has a sizable and positive effect on individual welfare 
use; there is no effect coming from the size of the enclave. Individual welfare 
use increases by almost 7 percent (2.6 percentage points) in response to an 
increase in the fraction of welfare dependents in the ethnic group by 10 percent. 
Second, when we break down the analysis to households with different IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  28
demographic characteristics and different earnings potential it is again ethnic 
welfare use in the neighborhood that matters; furthermore, the relative effect of 
changes in the quality of contacts is broadly the same across groups. The 
divisions of the sample that we have considered are clearly related to the 
economic status of the household, which is the determinant of welfare eligi-
bility. The results thus imply that that the neighborhood effects that we are 
considering do not vary much across households defined by predicted eligi-
bility status. 
In sum, the characteristics of the social network seem to have important 
effects on individual outcomes. In our setting, the quality of the contacts proves 
to be far more influential than the number of contacts. An interesting issue is 
why quality is important. As such, the quality of contacts may reflect norms 
and information (endogenous social interactions) as well as exogenous charac-
teristics of the contacts (exogenous social interactions). Since we have made no 
attempt to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous social interactions 
we cannot answer this question.     
However, we do think that information is not such a big part of the story in 
our setting. The policy experiment that we are using had the particular feature 
of introducing all refugee immigrants to welfare upon arrival. Therefore, it is 
likely that the enclave loses some of its role as an information provider on, e.g., 
the rules of the welfare system. This observation suggests that our estimates 
may represent lower bounds on the effects of the characteristics of the enclave 
on individual behavior: if there would be an information aspect to the network, 
the estimates would potentially be larger in size. Having said this, we note that 
recent research have found little support for the information aspect. Aizer and 
Currie (2002) find that the presence of network effects cannot be explained by 
information sharing within members of the network. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 reports the definitions and primary sources of data for variables used 
in the empirical analysis. Information on gender, age, and marital status come 
from the Income tax registers. The definition of these variables should be 
obvious and are not included. 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions and primary sources of data 
Variable Definition  Primary source of data 
Individual characteristics    
Welfare receipt  Dummy for the incidence of welfare 
receipt in the household.  
Income tax registers, 
Statistics Sweden 
(SCB). 
Welfare eligibility  Dummy for being a member of a 
household eligible for welfare. The 
income cut-off is the sum of the 
national norm (varying by the number 
of adults and kids in the household) 
and the average municipal rent in 
public rentals.  
Income tax registers, 
SCB, + additional 
information. 
Education  Highest degree attained. Education  register, 
SCB. 
Kids  Dummies for the number of kids ≤ 15 
years of age in the household.  
Income tax registers, 
SCB. 
Immigration year  Year of receipt of residence permit.  Population register, 
SCB. 
Country of origin  Immigrant source country; see table 
A3 for more details. 
Population register, 
SCB. 
Local/group characteristics    
Size of ethnic group ( cpt E )  Number of individuals from source 
country c residing in parish p at time t. 
Population register, 
SCB.  
Number of welfare recipients 
from an ethnic group ( cpt W ) 
Number of individuals from source 
country c residing in parish p at time t 
who are members of a welfare 
receiving household. 
Population register and 
Income tax register, 
SCB. 
Fraction of welfare recipients 
in ethnic group 
cpt cpt E W   Population register and 
Income tax register, 
SCB. 
 
Table A2 presents means and standard deviations of the variables relevant 
for the empirical analysis. 
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Table A2: Summary statistics: Means (Standard deviations) 
Variable All  Stayers  Movers 
Local/group characteristics     
























Individual characteristics     
Welfare receipt 2000  .390  .350  .404 
Welfare receipt in the year of immigration  .719  .717  .720 
Eligible for welfare (defined as total 
income<calculated income limit) 







Female .429  .513  .399 
Married or cohabiting  .576  .622  .560 
Kid .632  .675  .618 












Education: Missing   .054  .083  .044 
     < 9 years  .139  .172  .128 
     9–10 years  .139  .147  .136 
     High school ≤ 2 years  .179  .179  .179 
     High school > 2 years  .190  .158  .201 
     University < 3 years  .119  .098  .127 
     University ≥ 3 years  .179  .164  .185 
Immigration year: 1990  .454  .455  .454 
    1991  .546  .545  .546 
Region of origin: Former Yugoslavia   .059  .066  .056 
    Poland  .030  .041  .027 
    Baltic states  .005  .007  .005 
    Eastern Europe 1  .082  .100  .075 
    Eastern Europe 2  .015  .020  .013 
    Mexico and Central America  .019  .028  .016 
    Chile  .027  .047  .020 
    South America (excluding Chile)  .032  .040  .029 
    African Horn  .144  .063  .172 
    North Africa (Arabic countries) and Middle East   .179  .195  .173 
    Other Africa  .026  .031  .025 
    Iran  .140  .093  .156 
    Iraq  .106  .086  .114 
    Turkey  .034  .042  .031 
    South East Asia  .069  .098  .059 
    Other Asia  .034  .043  .030 
#  individuals  22,556 5,751 16,805 
Notes: Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the variables refer to the situation in. “Stayers” are 
those who stayed on in the assigned neighborhood between the year of immigration and 2000. 
“Movers” are those who moved between these two time points. 
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Table A3 provides a list of the “countries” of origin, at the levels of agg-
regation that we can observe them, of the individuals included in the analysis. 
 
Table A3: Source countries 
“Country” of birth  Percent of sample 
1. Former Yugoslavia  5.8 
2. Poland  3.0 
3. The Baltic states  0.5 
    Estonia  0.4 
    Latvia and Lithuania  0.1 
4. Eastern Europe 1  8.2 
    Rumania  3.5 
    The former USSR  2.8 
    Bulgaria  1.8 
    Albania  0.1 
5. Eastern Europe 2  1.5 
    Hungary  0.9 
    The former Czechoslovakia  0.6 
6. Mexico and Central America   1.9 
    El Salvador  1.0 
    Mexico  0.2 
    Other countries  0.7 
7. Chile  2.7 
8. Other South America  3.2 
    Peru  1.0 
    Brazil  0.7 
    Colombia  0.6 
    Argentina  0.4 
    Uruguay  0.3 
    Other countries  0.3 
9. African Horn  14.4 
    Ethiopia  8.3 
    Somalia  5.9 
    Sudan and Djibouti  0.2 
10. North Africa (Arabic countries) and 
Middle East 
17.9 
      Lebanon  9.7 
      Syria  3.3 
      Morocco  1.3 
      Tunisia  0.9 
      Egypt  0.7 
      Algeria  0.5 
      Israel  0.5 
      Palestine  0.4 
      Jordan  0.3 
      Other countries  0.3 
11. Other Africa   2.6 
      Gambia  0.7 
      Uganda  0.3 IFAU – Ethnic enclaves and welfare cultures  34
      Zaire  0.3 
      Ghana  0.2 
      Other countries  1.4 
12. Iran  14.0 
13. Iraq  10.7 
14. Turkey  3.3 
15. South East Asia  6.9 
      Vietnam  3.2 
      Thailand  1.9 
      the Philippines  1.2 
      Malaysia  0.2 
      Laos  0.2 
      Other countries  0.2 
16. Other Asia  3.4 
      Sri Lanka  1.0 
      Bangladesh  0.8 
      India  0.6 
      Afghanistan  0.4 
      Pakistan  0.4 
      Other countries  0.1 
Total (Sum of bold-faced numbers)  100 
Notes: China and North Korea are not included in our sample despite being refugee source 
countries. The reason for this is that these countries are lumped together with Japan. The bold 
face information represents the country of birth information that we have available in the data. 
For aggregates of countries we also present estimates for individual countries that have been 
derived by combining the information in the IFAU data base with the information in the LINDA 
data base; see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a description of LINDA. As a general rule we 
only list individual countries as long as they represent more the 0.2 percent of the inflow. 
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Table A4 reports the full set of estimates for the specifications in columns 
(3) and (4) of table 3. 
 
Table A4: Full set of estimates for specifications in cols. (3) and (4) of table 3 
 OLS  IV 
ln(fraction of welfare recipients in ethnic group)   .056  .263 
 (.006)  (.086) 
ln(# individuals from same ethnic group)  .028  –.004 
 (.003)  (.023) 
Age –.026  –.027 
 (.004)  (.004) 
Age squared  .040  .042 
 (.004)  (.004) 
Female .058  .066 
 (.012)  (.013) 
Married   .009  .006 
 (.012)  (.013) 
Married×female –.046  –.048 
 (.017)  (.018) 
Married or cohabiting  –.054  –.050 
 (.016)  (.017) 
(Married or cohabiting)×female  –.055  –.058 
 (.020)  (.021) 
Kids present in household  .075  .068 
 (.016)  (.017) 
Kids×female .018  .014 
 (.017)  (.018) 
# kids = 2   .030  .029 
 (.010)  (.011) 
# kids = 3  .137  .134 
 (.014)  (.015) 
# kids = 4  .252  .247 
 (.019)  (.020) 
# kids = 5  .341  .320 
 (.024)  (.027) 
# kids = 6  .426  .412 
 (.031)  (.033) 
# kids = 7  .502  .482 
 (.042)  (.042) 
# kids = 8  .317  .287 
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# kids = 9  .536  .518 
 (.039)  (.044) 
# kids = 10  .477  .427 
 (.149)  (.146) 
Education, 9-10 years  –.036  –.033 
 (.012)  (.013) 
Education, high school ≤ 2 years  –.114  –.118 
 (.012)  (.013) 
Education, high school > 2 years  –.132  –.127 
 (.013)  (.014) 
Education, university < 3 years  –.129  –.125 
 (.013)  (.016) 
Education, university ≥ 3 years  –.208  –.199 
 (.012)  (.017) 
Education, missing  –.077  –.076 
 (.017)  (.018) 
Immigration year = 1991  .043  .038 
 (.007)  (.008) 
Country of origin fixed effects  YES  YES 
Neigborhood fixed effects  YES  YES 
# individuals  22556  22556 
Standard error of regression .43  .45 
Mean of dependent variable  .390  .390 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. IV estimation is by 2SLS using the characteristics of the 
assigned neighborhoods as instruments for the characteristics in 2000. Robust variance estimates, 
allowing for correlation across individuals residing in the same parish.    
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